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______________
OPINION *
______________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
A jury found John Krasley guilty of fourteen counts of transporting, distributing,
receiving, and accessing child pornography between 2013 and 2018. A central issue at
trial was whether the internet connection used to commit the charged offenses was accessed
from inside or outside of Krasley’s residence. The Government introduced two sets of
evidence for the purpose of “location,” to show that the internet connection used for the
charged offenses was accessed from inside Krasley’s residence: (1) the titles of two deleted
video files from 2010 that law enforcement found on a thumb drive in the residence; and
(2) deleted chat messages from 2010 that law enforcement found on a desktop computer in
the residence. The District Court admitted both sets of evidence with a limiting instruction
for the jury to consider the evidence for “location” only and not for propensity purposes.
Krasley objected to the admission of the evidence before and during trial, and again on
appeal. For the reasons explained herein, we will affirm Krasley’s conviction.
I.
The Government charged John Krasley with fourteen counts of transporting,
distributing, receiving, and accessing child pornography on specific dates between March
4, 2013 and June 27, 2018, through Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses associated with the

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
*
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internet router in his residence. 1 Law enforcement had executed search warrants at
Krasley’s residence and seized his computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices
four times: in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2018. But the Government did not find child
pornography in Krasley’s residence during any of these searches. 2
Krasley did not dispute that his internet connection was used to view and traffic
child pornographic material for the charged offenses, but he denied that he was the person
who committed the offenses. 3 A central issue at trial was therefore “whether the internet
activity that [the Government] charged occurred from someone in Mr. Krasley’s house, i.e.
Mr. Krasley, or someone outside Mr. Krasley’s house . . . [who] wasn’t him.” 4 To that
end, the Government introduced two sets of evidence to show that the internet connection
used for the charged offenses was accessed from within Krasley’s residence, as opposed to
somewhere outside of Krasley’s residence. First, the Government introduced the titles of
two deleted video files on a thumb drive that was seized during the 2018 search of Krasley’s
residence. The video files were created in November 2010. The Government could not
view the videos themselves, but the titles were “consistent with child exploitation.” 5

The charges were two counts of transportation of child pornography, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1); six counts of distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); two counts of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2); and four counts of access with intent to view child pornography, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
2
The Government also did not find the software on any device necessary to communicate
on the Gigatribe file-sharing network used for the distribution counts.
3
Krasley denied ever uploading, downloading, sending, or receiving child pornography
from a computer or via the internet.
4
App. 121.
5
App. 385.
1
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Second, the Government introduced deleted “internet relay chat” messages 6 that were
recovered from the hard drive of a desktop computer seized during the 2013 search of
Krasley’s residence.

The chat messages discussed the trading of child exploitation

material, and were also from November 2010.
Krasley objected to the admission of this evidence through counsel before and
during trial. Before trial, Krasley moved to exclude the chat messages, claiming that they
were inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that their admission would
be unduly prejudicial. The Government argued that both the video titles and the chat
messages were admissible for the limited purpose of “location,” specifically, “the location
of the person who used Krasley’s internet connection to distribute, transport, receive or
access child pornography as charged in the indictment.” 7 The Government also argued
that “[t]he physical presence” of the evidence on a desktop computer and a thumb drive
found in Krasley’s residence, even though the files were deleted, “tends to make it more
likely that the person using his internet connection for the crimes charged was doing so
from Krasley’s home.” 8 The District Court ruled the disputed evidence admissible over
Krasley’s objection during a pretrial motions hearing.
Krasley renewed his objection during trial, but the District Court again ruled the
evidence admissible. The District Court concluded that: (1) both the video titles and the
chat messages were proffered for a proper purpose of “show[ing] the physical location of

Internet relay chat (“IRC”) messages are from internet chat rooms.
App. 53, 78.
8
App. 53, 78–79.
6
7
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the user of Krasley’s internet connection, not that [Krasley] had the propensity to commit
the crimes charged”9; (2) the evidence was relevant “as it makes it more likely that the
child pornography trading activity was at least discussed on the [chat messages] . . . from
Mr. Krasley’s residence in 2010,” which in turn “makes it more likely that the child
pornography trading activity that occurred on Mr. Krasley’s internet [for the charged
offenses] did occur from within Mr. Krasley’s residence” 10; and (3) the probative value of
the evidence is “high as it establishes a connection between Mr. Krasley’s residence and
child pornography activity,” and also that the evidence is “not unfairly prejudicial.” 11
The District Court gave a limiting instruction to the jury, instructing the jury to
consider this evidence only to decide where the person who accessed Krasley’s internet
and committed the charged offenses was located, and not for any other purpose, including
as evidence of Krasley’s bad character or propensity to commit crimes. 12
Aside from the disputed evidence from 2010, the Government also introduced
evidence on the specific charged offenses between 2013 and 2018. The jury found Krasley
guilty of all fourteen counts of transporting, distributing, receiving, and accessing child
pornography.

The District Court sentenced Krasley to 240 months’ imprisonment,

followed by ten years of supervised release. Krasley appealed.

App. 419.
App. 419.
11
App. 420.
12
The District Court instructed the jury three times: (1) at the presentation of the video
titles, (2) at the presentation of the chat messages, and (3) after closing arguments.
9

10
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II.
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review a
district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. 13 An abuse of discretion
occurs where the district court’s decision is “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable”—
in short, where “no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.” 14 However,
we exercise plenary review over a district court’s rulings “to the extent they are based on
a legal interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,” 15 including “whether evidence
falls within the scope of Rule 404(b).” 16
III.
On appeal, Krasley argues that the District Court erred in admitting the video titles
and the chat messages for three reasons. First, Krasley argues that the Government did not
allege, and the District Court did not find, that he committed the prior acts related to the
video titles or the chat messages, or that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could find that he did. Second, Krasley argues that an essential unstated link in the
Government’s proffer was the propensity inference that Rule 404(b) prohibits—that the
person who committed the prior acts in his residence in 2010 was the same person

United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Green, 617
F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010).
14
United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ansell v. Green Acres
Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003)).
15
Green, 617 F.3d at 239 (quoting Complaint of Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126,
131 (3d Cir. 1997)).
16
Id. (quoting United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2003)).
13
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responsible for the charged offenses. Third, Krasley argues that the District Court erred in
conducting a Rule 403 balancing test between the probative value of the evidence and the
danger of unfair prejudice. Finally, Krasley argues that the erroneous admission of this
evidence was not harmless because there is a significant possibility that at least one
member of the jury would have reached a different verdict without it. We discuss each
argument in turn.
A.
First, Krasley argues that the District Court erred in admitting the video titles and
chat messages as “prior acts” evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because the
Government did not argue—nor did the District Court find—that he committed the prior
acts. He also argues that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could find
that he committed the prior acts.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits propensity evidence: “Evidence of any
other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” 17 Even
so, evidence may be admissible under Rule 404(b) for a non-propensity purpose, “such as
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” 18 Admissibility under Rule 404(b) requires four elements:
(1) the other-acts evidence must be proffered for a non-propensity purpose; (2) that
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); see also Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276 (“By introducing the list of
permissible purposes with the words ‘such as,’ the drafters made clear that the list was not
exclusive or otherwise limited to a strictly defined class.”).
17
18
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evidence must be relevant to the identified non-propensity purpose; (3) the probative value
of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for causing unfair
prejudice to the defendant; and (4) if requested, a limiting instruction must accompany the
evidence. 19 Under Rule 404(b), “similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can
reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” 20 As a
result, “Rule 404(b) only applies to evidence of a defendant’s other bad acts or crimes, not
those of third parties.” 21
The disputed evidence was not proffered as Krasley’s prior acts. The Government
did not argue or allege that Krasley viewed the videos or authored the chat messages, or
even that Krasley knew of the existence of this material in his residence. The District Court
even acknowledged, “as the Government admits, [the chat messages] cannot be attributed
to Mr. Krasley or any other individual.” 22 Since it was not argued or established that
Krasley committed any prior acts related to the videos or the chat messages, Rule 404(b)
does not apply. 23 Nevertheless, the evidence is still subject to other rules of evidence.
B.
Second, Krasley argues that the District Court erred in admitting the disputed
evidence as relevant despite an impermissible propensity inference that, because Krasley

United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 241 (3d Cir. 2017); Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276–78.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988) (emphasis added).
21
United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 125 (3d Cir. 2016).
22
App. 416.
23
Cf. Bailey, 840 F.3d at 125 (holding that Rule 404(b) does not apply to video evidence
of a murder in which the Government stipulated that none of the defendants engaged in or
plotted to engage in the murder).
19
20
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engaged in child pornography in 2010, he committed the charged offenses of child
pornography between 2013 and 2018. Krasley contends that the Government’s proffer of
“location” as a non-propensity purpose for the evidence was merely a clever substitute for
“perpetrator” and an end run around the propensity prohibition under Rule 404(b).
Krasley’s argument is unavailing. We already found that Rule 404(b) does not
apply because the Government did not argue or allege that Krasley committed the prior
acts in 2010. Although Rule 404(b) does not apply, the disputed evidence must be relevant
to be admissible. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is “relevant” if (1) “it has
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence,”
and (2) “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” 24 Relevant evidence is
generally admissible, so “the bar for what constitutes relevant evidence is low.” 25 The
District Court held that the evidence was relevant because it makes it more likely that
activity related to child pornography occurred within Krasley’s residence in 2010, which
in turn makes it more likely that the activity for the charged offenses also occurred within
Krasley’s residence.
We agree.

The disputed evidence is relevant because the existence of child

pornographic material on devices in Krasley’s residence made it more likely that the
internet connection used for the charged offenses was also made from within his residence.
The evidence therefore helped the jury determine whether to accept or reject Krasley’s

24
25

Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 114 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 402).
9

defense that the internet connection used for the charged offenses was made from
somewhere outside of his residence.
C.
Third, Krasley argues that the District Court erred in the Rule 403 balancing test
because the video titles and the chat messages do not have probative value, and because
any probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” 26 We
reverse a district court’s conclusion under Rule 403 only if we find the conclusion to be an
abuse of discretion, meaning that the conclusion is “arbitrary or irrational.” 27 “If judicial
self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by
an appellate tribunal.” 28
The District Court here found that the disputed evidence was not unfairly prejudicial
and had high probative value because it established a connection between Krasley’s
residence and child pornographic activity within the residence. The District Court did not
reach this conclusion lightly. It received written briefings and heard argument from the
parties on the admissibility of the disputed evidence before trial, and it again heard
argument from the parties during trial. Each time, the District Court scrutinized the
evidence and weighed the probative value against any potential prejudicial effect, as
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
United States v. Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 1997)).
28
United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978).
26
27
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required by Rule 403. Each time, the District Court found that the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice. 29
Furthermore, the District Court instructed the jury three times—once at the
presentation of each set of evidence, and again after closing argument—that the jury may
consider the disputed evidence only to decide where the person who accessed Krasley’s
internet and committed the charged offenses was located, and not for any other purpose
such as evidence of Krasley’s character or propensity to commit crimes. The provision of
a limiting instruction can alleviate the potential prejudice of evidence admitted over a Rule
403 objection since these instructions mitigate concerns that the jury would use the
evidence to draw an improper propensity inference. 30 Juries are presumed to follow
limiting instructions. 31 The limiting instructions here provide additional support that no
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the disputed evidence.

On the first day of trial, the District Court expressed concern about the disputed evidence
being propensity evidence, about the prejudicial effect of the evidence, and about the jury
potentially misusing the evidence. Despite this initial concern, on the second day of trial,
the District Court—presumably after taking the evening to consider the issues again—
reaffirmed its earlier holding from the pretrial hearing that the evidence was admissible.
This further demonstrates that the District Court thoroughly considered the evidence under
Rule 403.
30
United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 198 (3d Cir. 2018); Repak, 852 F.3d at 247;
see also United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 748 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he risk of unfair
prejudice was minimized by the district court’s instruction to the jury on the limited use of
the . . . evidence.”).
31
See United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Givan,
320 F.3d 452, 462 (3d Cir. 2003).
29
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We do not find that the District Court acted arbitrarily or irrationally in admitting
either the video titles or the chat messages over Krasley’s objections. We therefore find
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed evidence.
D.
Finally, Krasley argues that the erroneous admission of the disputed evidence was
not harmless because there is a significant possibility that at least one member of the jury
would have reached a different verdict without the evidence. We are not convinced.
As we have already stated, the District Court did not err in admitting either the video
titles or the chat messages. Nevertheless, even if the admission of this evidence were
erroneous, any error was harmless. “An evidentiary error is harmless if ‘it is highly
probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment,’ which ‘requires that the court
possess a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant.’” 32

The

Government presented abundant direct and circumstantial evidence for the jury to reach
the same verdict, without needing to consider the disputed evidence. 33 This other evidence
includes evidence showing that: the IP addresses associated with Krasley’s internet router
were the same IP addresses used for each of the charged offenses; Krasley was present in
his home on the dates and times that child pornographic activity occurred for the charged
offenses; the neighbors were unlikely to receive a usable signal from Krasley’s router due

Bailey, 840 F.3d at 124 (quoting United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir.
1995) (en banc)).
33
Cf. id. (finding that the district court’s erroneous admission of video evidence was
harmless where the Government presented “abundant evidence” of the charges and the
defendant’s liability).
32
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to their distance from Krasley’s residence and the unique password for his router; and
connections to the file-sharing network Gigatribe by usernames known to be used by
Krasley correlated with Krasley’s presence and absence from his residence. Based on the
totality of the Government’s evidence, it is highly probable that the admission of the video
titles or the chat messages—if erroneous—did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. 34
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Krasley’s conviction.

We again note that the District Court gave a limiting instruction on the disputed evidence
three times. As discussed earlier, juries are presumed to follow limiting instructions, which
undermines Krasley’s argument that the jury used the disputed evidence for the exact
purpose for which they were instructed not to use the evidence.

34
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